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Executive Summary
We are engaged in a long-term project to analyze the determinants of health
care cost differences across firms. An important first step is to summarize the
nature of expenditure differences across plans. The goal of this article is to de-
velop methods for identifying and quantifying those factors that account for
the wide differences in health care expenditures observed across plans.
We consider eight plans that vary in average expenditure for individuals
filing claims, from a low of $1,645 to a high of $2,484. We present a statistically
consistent method for decomposing the cost differences across plans into com-
ponent parts based on demographic characteristics of plan participants, the
mix of diagnoses for which participants are treated, and the cost of treatment
for particular diagnoses. The goal is to quantify the contribution of each of
these components to the difference between average cost and the cost in a
given firm. The demographic mix of plan enrollees accounts for wide differ-
ences in cost ($649). Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the results is that,
after adjusting for demographic mix, the difference in expenditures accounted
for by the treatment costs given diagnosis ($807) is almost as wide as the unad-
justed range in expenditures ($838). Differences in cost due to the different ill-
nesses that are treated, after adjusting for demographic mix, also accounts for
large differences in cost ($626). These components of cost do not move to-
gether; for example, demographic mix may decrease expenditure under a par-
ticular plan while the diagnosis mix may increase costs.
Our hope is that understanding the reasons for cost differences across plans
will direct more focused attention to controlling costs. Indeed, this work is in-
tended as an important first step toward that goal.
Almost two-thirds of Americans under sixty-five are covered by em-
ployer insurance plans. Like the costs of Medicare coverage for elderly
Americans, employer medical costs have risen rapidly in the past sev-
eral decades. For part of the 1990s, this growth slowed with the adop-
tion of a broad range of managed-care methods and other steps to2 Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
control costs. But recent reports indicate that, despite these reforms,
private insurance costs are rising again.
Through the 1990s, research on the consequences of cost control ef-
forts in private insurance plans has been limited. Unlike the uniform
national provisions of the fee-for-service Medicare system, the provi-
sions of employer plans vary greatly from firm to firm, as do the costs
of medical care, suggesting that differences in plan provisions may
have a substantial effect on health care expenditures. Thus, analysis of
employer plans provides a unique opportunity to understand the rela-
tionship between plan provisions and expenditures for health care.
The mechanisms that might be effective in controlling cost, however,
will depend on the source of cost differences. For example, if cost dif-
ferences are accounted for mostly by a small number of plan enrollees
who are treated for specific high-cost illnesses, efforts to control cost
must necessarily focus on the treatment of these illness. If cost differ-
ences are due to variation in the use of intensive procedures, then it is
important to know what these procedures are and what types of pa-
tients are treated differently. In contrast, if cost differences result from
more modest differences in the expendituresincurred by a large num-
ber of enrollees, then effective cost-control mechanisms would have to
be directed toward the medical utilization of more typical enrollees, for
example, those who use only outpatient services.
In this article we focus not on the incentive effects of plan provi-
sionswhether demand-side price incentives or supply-side limits on
carebut on the sources of cost differences across plans. We are en-
gaged in a long-term project to analyze the determinants of cost differ-
ences across firms. In particular, we look forward toempirical analysis
that can be used to predict the effect on medical expenditures of spe-
cific changes in medical insurance plan provisions. The project is based
on insurance claims records from a large number of employers.The
vast amount of information on insurance claims records is both a bless-
ing and a curse. A key advantage of claims data is the amount of detail
they provide. They provide enormous opportunity to study the nature
of treatments and expenditures in employer-provided plans, but they
also present a substantial analytic challenge.
We began work in this area by describing where the money goes in a
single large firm (McClellan and Wise 1995). We have also used the
panel nature of the data to direct attention to the relationship between
individual health care expenditures over time, focusing on the implica-
tions of persistence for the feasibility of medical saving accountsWhy Do Some Firms Spend So Muchon Medical Care? 3
(Eichner, McClellan, and Wise 1997,1998). But the analysis dealt only
with expenditure over time ina single firm. Eichner (1997) considered
the incentive effects of the provisionsof a menu of plans, again withina
single firm.
An important first step in comparingexpenditure across many plans
is to summarize the nature ofexpenditure differences across plans,
which is attempted in this article. Inparticular, the goal is to under-
stand what accounts for the wide differencesin health care expendi-
hires across plans. We presenta statistically consistent method for
decomposing expenditures, thusproviding an understanding of the
sources of differences across firms. While thismethod is perhaps the
most important focus of the article, thesubstantive results are also of
interest. Our hope is that understandingthe reasons for cost differences
across plans will direct more focused attentionto analysis of the ways
that costs can be controlled. Indeed, thiswork is intended as an impor-
tant first step toward that goal.
We consider eight plans thatvary in average expenditure for indi-
viduals filing claims, froma low of $1,645 to a high of $2,484. We then
propose a method to decompose these differencesinto their compo-
nent parts. The goal is to quantify the contributionof each component
to total cost variation across firms. We believethat this method allows
us to point directly to the sources of cost differences andthus help us to
focus subsequent analysis where itis most likely to make a difference.
This general analysis of cost variationacross plans can then provide the
basis for additional studies of the effectsof plan provisions on costs.
Identifying the effect of planprovisions on health care costs iscom-
plicated for several reasons. Differencesin plan costs may be caused by
many factors other than plan incentive effects, includinggeographic lo-
cation and the demographic attributes of planmembers. Much more
difficult to account forare unobserved differences in the types of indi-
viduals selecting health plans; individualswho expect to usemore
health care, who aremore risk averse, or who possess a "taste" for
health care are more likely to choosemore generous plans when an em-
ployer offers a menu of plans. Eichner (1997)has devoted a great deal
of attention to this issue. Andwe will return to it once the sources of
cost differences are understood better.
Our work using large longitudinal datasets on firm employees and
their dependents is insome ways analogous to studies using large lon-
gitudinal Medicare claims databases.An extensive research literature
has documented large variations intreatment rates and intensity for4 Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
many illnesses in the elderly,leading to enormous variations in costs
across groups of beneficiariesbased on geographic residence and many
other characteristics. All beneficiaries in thetraditional Medicare pro-
gram are subject to essentiallythe same health plan characteristics. But
Medicare data have been used to documentthat many other policy-
relevant factors, including state laws,competition, managed care
pressures, socioeconomic status,and technology availability, can sig-
nificantly influence Medicare costs andpossibly patient outcomes
through various mechanisms.
Our research represents a first effort to usedetailed medical claims
data from large firms to understand the sourcesand causes of medical
expenditure differences across firms. Previousstudies of private health
insurance have focused almost entirely onfirm surveys, population
surveys, or hospital dischargedatabases, none of which are adequate
to obtain a comprehensive understandingof health care spending by
private plans. Records from individual insurershave been used to de-
scribe the major components of health carespending. But these studies
typically involve a pool of records for coveredindividuals of many em-
ployers and thus are based on diverse financialincentives to use ser-
vices and may not represent an entire firmpopulation. Detailed firm
data have also been used in a few studies toprovide evidence on differ-
ences in the cause of treatmentfor some conditions. To our knowledge,
the evidence we present here is the firstdetailed decomposition of the
sources of cost differences acrosshealth plans.
We consider both the rate of treatmentand the treatment cost given
treatment for thirty diagnostic groups. Wefirst consider how much of
the rate and the cost for each treatment canbe attributed to the demo-
graphic mix of plan members. The totaldemographic effect is divided
between the effect of demographic mix onthe rate of diagnoses and on
the effect on treatment cost given diagnosis.The cost differences that
remain after the demographic adjustment, arealso divided between
rate and treatment effects.
Previous descriptive studies havedocumented cost differences asso-
ciated with firm location and employeedemographic characteristics,
based largely on aggregate cost differences.Whether cost variation
across plans is due to moreintensive treatment of a few high-cost en-
rollees or to marginally more intensive treatmentfor the majority of
plan enrollees is unknown. We believethat understanding where the
intensity, and hence cost, of treatment differswill be the basis for addi-
tional analysis of the effects of plan provisions oncosts.Why Do Some Firms Spend So Muchon Medical Care? 5
Detailed descriptive analysesmay also provide evidence on how
cost differences due to selection effects arisewithin plans. Understand-
ing both the incentives of plan provisionsand the effects of choosinga
plan may be enhanced by analysis aimedat identifying the kind of pa-
tients and medical treatments that contributemost to cost differences.
For example, a larger proportion of patientswith heart disease or other
chronic illness enrolling inone plan out of a menu of plans from which
employees can choosemay well reflect selection effects. On the other
hand, higher costs due to acute conditionsthat can be treated in very
different ways, such as a back injuryor heart attack, may reflect plan
provision (incentive) effects. Similarly, highercosts due to more inten-
sive treatment given the occurrence ofan illness may represent plan in-
centive effects as these affect patients, providers,or both. Describing
the sources of cost differences at this levelof detail not only provides
some evidence about whether cost differencesare due to selection or
incentive effects but also providesa detailed foundation for more ex-
plicit causal studies of how plan provisionsaffect expenditures. For
example, studies of changes in incidenceor intensity of particular
health problems resulting from reforms inhealth plan structureare
likely to provide insight into howparticular plan provisions affect
expenditures.
We address many but not all of thesequestions by analyzing cost dif-
ferences in insurance plans offered by eight firms.We first describe the
claims data used for the analysis andpresent summary information on
medical expenditures in the selected firms.We then describe the de-
composition method used to determine thesources of cost differences
among these eight firms. Calculations basedon this method are then
presented in graphs. The last section isa summary and discussion.
I.The Data and Summary Description
The Data
The analysis is based ona unique data set obtained from MedStat/
Systemetrics. The data provide comprehensiveinformation on medical
utilization for enrollees in various employer-providedhealth insurance
regimes. The data include all inpatient andoutpatient health insurance
claims filed by employees and their dependentsin forty-five firms that
self-insure; that is, these firmsmay pay an insurance carrier to process
claims and help control costs but not toassume financial risk. All risk is6 Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
borne by the employer, who essentially paysthe annual medical bills of
its employees and their dependents.The firms are drawn from several
industries and reflect a range of health care costexperiences, plan pro-
visions, and workforce characteristics.
The data content is standardized through anongoing process with
MedStat designed to provide essentiallyidentical data for each firm.
Each claim includes a patient identifier, aprovider identifier, the date
of the medical service, the claim amount,the co-payment and deduct-
ible amounts paid by the patient, the placeof servicehospital, physi-
cian office, intermediate care facility,etc.and ICD-9 and CPT-4 codes
identifying the principal diagnoses andprocedures performed. While
we expect that ourprocedure coding is generally accurate(they
influence billing in our participating plans),several studies have docu-
mented the limited reliability of particulardiagnosis codes, especially
in the outpatient setting. For this reason,in the principal analysis re-
ported here, we group patients who receiveoutpatient-only treatment
into a single residual category andfocus our disease-specific analysis
on patients who receive someinpatient treatment. (We report the cost
for inpatient versus outpatient analysisfor mental health and sub-
stance abuse care in someillustrative additional analysis at the end of
the article.) We also focus on a patient'spredominant diagnosis
(defined below) to minimize the impact ofspecific erroneously re-
ported claims. The patient's age, sex, relationship tothe employee, and
employment statushourly or salaried, active orretiredare also re-
ported in our data.
The primary goal of this article is to illustrate ourdecomposition
procedure for understanding the sourcesof cost differences across
firms. The analysis is based onexpenditures in eight plans in seven
large firms and considers differences in averageannual individual ex-
penditures, treatment rates, treatmentintensity, and "prices" of treat-
ment based on three years of pooledclaims data. The firms were
selected for this initial study partly because theyoffer only one plan to
each employee. One of the firms has two plans,but each plan serves a
different employee group. Using one-planfirms helps ensure that the
cost differences observed are notconfounded by the self-selection of
employees into plans. It is possible thatemployees select firms based
on health plancharacteristics or, conversely, that the aggregatecharac-
teristics of firm employees influence thehealth plans offered. Because
our firms have thousandsof employees and dependents, however, aWhy Do Some Firms Spend So Much on Medical Care? 7
large number of employees would have to select the firmprimarily for
health insurance reasons rather than other firm characteristicsfor such
an effect to be substantial.
Summary Data
Each person who reports medical spending ina year is assigned to a
"predominant diagnosis group." Thisgroup is the one to which the
largest share of an enrollee's expenditurescan be allocated. There are
thirty such groups listed in table 1.1. Thesegroups include outpatient
and "residual," which includes expenditures not assignedto any of the
identified groups. Persons whoare assigned to the lung cancer group,
for example, have spent a substantial amount for thetreatment of lung
cancer. They are likely to have had some expenditures reported in
other diagnosis groups for care that mayor may not be related to lung
cancer.
The diagnosis groups are listed in table 1.1 by theaverage cost of
treatmentover all eight plansgiven that diagnosisgroup. The aver-
age treatment cost ranges from $34,736 for lung cancer to $1,110 for the
outpatient predominant diagnosis group. Theaverage diagnosis rate is
shown in the first column of the table. Almost 92percent of enrollees
are in the outpatient group. The diagnosis rate for the othergroups is
typically well under I in 100 and often as lowas 1 in 1,000. Approxi-
mately 2 percent of enrollees are in the residualgroup. The diagnosis
rate times the treatment cost given diagnosis gives theaverage cost per
enrollee, shown in the third column of the table. Finally, theproportion
of total expenditures accounted for by each diagnosisgroup is shown
in the last column. About 48 percent of cost is accounted for bythe 92
percent of employees in the outpatient group and about 18percent is
accounted for by the approximately 2 percent whoare in the residual
category. The remaining 34 percent is accounted for by the 6percent of
persons in the other diagnostic groups. We will see that differences
across firms in both diagnosis rates and treatment cost given diagnosis
account for large differences in average expenditure. Indeed, bothmay
contribute to higher or lower costs in thesame firm, or one may in-
crease and the other may decrease cost in the same firm.
The key elements of cost difference are the diagnosisrate and treat-
ment cost given diagnosis. The diagnosis rates in each planare shown
in table 1.2. The treatment costsare shown in table 1.3. Consider8 Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
Table 1.1













Lung cancer 0.00027 34,736 9.36 0.0044
Colorectal cancer 0.00031 27,819 8.71 0.0041
AMI 0.00117 26,651 31.29 0.0147
Chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease 0.00056 25,179 14.17 0.0067
Stroke: occlusive and
hemorrhagic 0.00077 24,901 19.19 0.0090
Congenital 0.00034 23,131 7.78 0.0037
Neonatal care 0.00091 22,917 20.83 0.0098
Heart failure 0.00072 22,826 16.40 0.0077
Arthritis 0.00087 22,788 19.82 0.0093
Prostate cancer 0.00029 20,000 5.87 0.0028
IHD, chest pain 0.00558 18,270 102.02 0.0480
Residual 0.02225 17,656 392.93 0.1847
Breast cancer 0.00032 17,594 5.67 0.0027
Psychotic/major affective
psychosis 0.00413 16,759 69.28 0.0326
Back/spine disorders 0.00257 15,509 39.92 0.0188
Neurotic 0.00144 15,050 21.73 0.0102
Injury/trauma 0.00401 13,964 55.94 0.0263
Diabetes 0.00081 13,228 10.70 0.0050
Gallbladder disease 0.00213 11,442 24.34 0.0114
Substance abuse 0.00262 10,944 28.70 0.0135
Respiratory infection 0.00299 9,872 29.48 0.0139
Benign female pelvic, etc. 0.00469 9,383 44.02 0.0207
Appendicitis 0.00104 8,123 8.49 0.0040
BPH/urinary obstruction 0.00145 7,972 11.57 0.0054
Asthma 0.00126 7,792 9.84 0.0046
Abnormal pregnancy 0.00393 7,406 29.09 0.0137
Abnormal childbirth 0.00653 6,234 40.73 0.0191
Normal childbirth, mother 0.00279 5,350 14.94 0.0070
Normal childbirth, child 0.00475 3,152 14.97 0.0070
Outpatient 0.91847 1,110 1,019.55 0.4793
All 1.00000 2,127.33 1.0000Why Do Some Firms Spend So Much on Medical Care? 9
substance abuse, for example. The diagnosis rate varies from a low of 5
in 10,000 enrollees to a high of 60 in 10,000. The treatment cost varies
from a high of $17,377 to a low of $7,117.
Beginning with the data in tables 1.2 and 1.3 (including the raw data
that underlie the means), we want to decompose the average cost dif-
ferences across plans, which range from a low of $1,645 to a high of
$2,484. There are three reasons for cost differences: (1) differences in the
demographic attributesage and genderof enrollees, (2) differences
in the illnesses that are treatedthe diagnosis rate, and (3) differences
in the cost of treating illnesses. Our goal is to attribute observed cost
differences to these three sources. A particular complication is that
treatment cost differences across plans may vary substantially by diag-
nosis, and we would like to know which diagnoses account for differ-
ences in treatment cost. A firm with low treatment cost for one
diagnosis may have high treatment cost for another diagnosis; thus, it
is important to consider possible interactions across diagnoses in addi-
tion to the interaction between diagnoses and treatment cost.
II.The Decomposition of Cost Differences
We begin with the eight plans described above. As explained, the mem-
bers of each plan are divided into thirty "predominant" diagnosis cate-
gories, defined by the diagnosis group in which the largest share ofa
member's expenditure in a given year occurred. The datacan be
thought of as arranged in two 30 by 8 matrices, as shown in tables 1.1
and 1.2. The first matrix reports the proportion of enrollees in each plan
who are in each of the diagnosis groups. The second matrix reports the
average cost of treating patients in each of the diagnosis groups.
We want to know why the costs in one plan differ from the average
cost. Consider diagnosis k: what accounts for the difference in expendi-
ture for treating patients in this diagnosis in plan i, compared to the av-
erage expenditure for treating patients with diagnosis k? The diagnosis
could be pregnancy, or cancer, or outpatient care, for example. The rela-
tive cost depends on two factors: (1) the proportion of enrollees treated
for diagnosis k (the rate) and (2) the cost of their treatment given that
diagnosis. Both the rate and the cost will depend on the demographic
mix (age and gender) of persons in plan i compared to the average mix
across all plans. First we control for demographic mix and then consid-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































414 Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
First, how much of the rate and the cost foreach treatment can be attributed to
the demographic mix of plan members?
Total demographic effect is decomposed into:
Effect of demographic mix on the rate of diagnosis
Effect of demographic mix on treatment cost given diagnosis
Interaction
Second, the cost differences that remain after demographicadjustment are bro-
ken down as follows.
Total remaining effect is decomposed into:
Difference due to diagnosis rate
Difference due to treatment cost given diagnosis
Interaction
Third, the interaction between the first and second components.
In discussing the results below, we will ignorethe third component
and, for the most part, the other interaction terms aswell. These terms
ensure that the decomposition componentsadd to total expenditure,
but they are small. The technical details ofthe decomposition are pre-
sented and discussed in Eichner, McClellan, and Wise(1999).
III.Results for the Eight Plans
The decomposition results for the eight plans areexplained in some de-
tail here. The presentation is primarily graphical,but we begin with ta-
ble 1.4 because it presents the completedecomposition succinctly. The
eight plans are ordered from left to right by meanexpenditure per
enrollee, which is shown in the thirteenth row of thetable. The average
cost over all plans is $2,127 and is shownin the twelfth row. The differ-
ence between the plan meanand the overall average is shown in the
last row of the table. This difference isdecomposed into the elements
shown in the rows above. The difference isdivided into three main
components that correspond to the sourcesidentified above: demo-
graphic adjustment, demographic adjusted difference, andthe interac-
tion between the two. Each of the first two maincomponents is
decomposed into three "mix effects": rate, cost, andinteraction. The
third main component is composed of only two terms.The sum of the
sources of cost difference isequal to the difference between the plan
cost and the overall average across all plans, orthe sum of the sources
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For example, consider plan 15. Theexpenditure per enrollee in plan
15 is $482 less than the average.The demographic adjustment effect is
$152, which means that thedemographic mix in plan 15 increases the
costrelative to the other plansby$152. But the increase in expendi-
hire due to demographic mix isoffset by a lower demographically ad-
justed expenditure. The demographicadjusted expenditure effect is
$622, which means that afteradjusting for demographic mix expen-
diture per enrollee in plan 15 is$622 less than the average. The sum of
the demographic adjustment ($152)plus the expenditure effect ($622)
plus the small interaction term ($12)is equal to the expenditure dif-
ference of $482.
Each of these three components isfurther decomposed into rate and
cost effects (and a small interactioneffect). For example, the demo-
graphic mix in plan 15 increases the treatmentrate in higher cost diag-
noses, which increasesexpenditures relative to the average by $65.
And the demographic mix also increasesthe cost of treatment, which
increases expenditures relative tothe average by $86. The sum of the
rate effect ($65), the cost effect ($86),and the small interaction effect
($1) is equal to the totaldemographic adjustment ($152). The demo-
graphic adjusted expenditure effect isalso decomposed into a rate ef-
fect, a cost effect, and an interaction.For plan 15, the rate effect is
$197, which means that, aftercontrolling for demographic mix, the
diagnosis rate is concentrated in lower costdiagnoses, relative to the
average. The treatment costeffect is $432, which means that treat-
ment cost is lower than average.The sum of the rate effect ($197),the
cost effect ($432), and the smallinteraction effect ($7) equals the total
demographic adjusted expenditure effect ($622).
The elements of the decompositionexplained above pertain to all of
the thirty diagnoses combined, and weoften refer to them as mix ef-
fects. To understand the contributionof differences from the average
for particular diseases, however, it maybe useful to consider the com-
ponents for a single diagnosis. Supposethat we are considering expen-
diture for a given diagnosis k in agiven plan i, after controlling for the
demographic mix in the plan. Figure1.1 shows the procedure. The
square defined bysolid lines represents the averageexpendi-
tureacross all firmsof treating personsin diagnosis group k. The
deviation of the cost in plan i from the average overall plans is repre-
sented by the three components of the outerbox: (1) the rate effect, rep-
resented by the top slice, which is theadded expenditure due to the








Rate effect in firm I
Costtreatment
Figure 1.1








at the base level; (2) the cost effect, represented by the righthand slice,
which is due to the higher cost of treating diagnosis k in firm i, holding
the treatment rate at the base level; and (3) the product of the rate dif-
ference times the expenditure difference, the interaction term, which is
represented by the small square at the upper right.
We explain the details of the deconstruction with the aid of several
figures. To begin, the total expenditure differences across the eight
plans, taken from the last row of figure 1.7, are graphed in figure 1.2.
The range is from $482 to + $356, a difference of $838. These expendi-
ture differences are graphed in figure 1.3 together with the expenditure
differences after adjusting for differences in demographic mix across
firms. For example, relative to the average, expenditure in plan 15 is
even lower after the demographic adjustment. The demographic mix
in plan 15 increases expenditure relative to the average. Overall, the de-
mographic adjustments are quite substantial, from $360 to +$289,a
range of $649. Nonetheless, even after adjusting for demographic mix,
the difference in expenditure is still very large, from $642 in plan 15
to $163 in plan 21, a range of $772. Thus, the range in demographic ad-
justed expenditures is not much less than the $838 range in unadjusted
expenditures. But the demographic adjustment changes the order of





-600 I I I I I
PIanl5 P1an26 Planl2 Plan25 PIanl8 PIan2a PIan2l PIan2b
Total Difference
Figure 1.2
Total expenditure difference before demographic adjustment
higher than unadjusted expenditures in plan 12, but in plan 2a, ad-
justed expenditures are much lower than the unadjusted expenditures.
Perhaps the most important results are shown in figure 1.4, which
describes the decomposition of the difference in expenditure that re-
mains after the demographic adjustment. Suppose that all ratesand
treatment costs have been adjusted for demographic mix. What ac-
counts for the remaining difference? Refer again to figure 1.4.There are
three sources of the difference between the expenditure in a plan and
the average expenditure over all plans: (1) the difference in diagnosis
rate, holding the treatment cost at the average; (2) thedifference in
treatment cost, holding the diagnosis rate at the average; and (3) the in-
teraction of the first two. The first bar in figure 1.4 reproduces thedif-
ference in expenditure adjusted for the demographic mix shown in
figure 1.3.
The next three bars show how the difference holding the demo-
graphic mix constant is divided into the three sources. The second bar
shows the difference that can be attributed tO the diagnosis rate mix. A
bar extending upward, like that for plan 2b, for example, indicates that
the rate mix in plan 2b is concentrated in higher cost diagnoses, relative
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Figure 1.3
Total expenditure difference before and after demographic adjustment
goes from a low of $285 in plan 25 to a high of $341 in plan 2b, a range
of $626.
The next bar indicates the difference thatcan be attributed to differ-
ences in treatment cost. Again, a bar extending upward indicates that
treatment cost, given diagnosis, is higher than theaverage. After ad-
justing for demographic mix, the range in cost thatcan be attributed to
treatment cost differences alone is still very largefroma low of $432
in plan 15 to a high of $375 in plan 21, a range of $807.
The last bar shows the interaction between diagnosisrate deviations
from the average rate and treatment cost deviations from theaverage.
A bar extending downward indicatesa negative correlation between
the two. This component is typically negative, although thereare two
very small positive values (plan 15 and plan 12). Consider plan 25, for
example. The diagnosis rate mix favors diagnoses having lowaverage
treatment cost. But in this firm, treatment costs tend to be higher than
the average. Looking across the plans, the negative interactioncompo-
nents indicate that lower diagnosis rates are typically associated with
higher treatment costs, although the effect is small. The firm,on aver-
age, treats fewer enrollees for high-cost diagnoses, but treatment costs














Decomposition of adjusted expenditure difference
Unlike the demographic mix that changes the rate mixand the cost
mix in the same direction, the demographically adjusted rateand cost
mix seem to follow no particular pattern across firms. (Thewithin-firm
interaction between rate and cost tends to be negative, as emphasized
above.) Figure 1.5 presents the same data as figure 1.4, but infigure 1.5
the plans are ordered by the total adjusted expenditure difference. it is
easy to see in this figure that theredoesn't seem to be a particular rela-
tionship between the component attributable to the rate mixand the
portion attributable to the cost mix. For the three planswith the lowest
adjusted cost, no component is positive (with the exception of thesmall
interaction term for plan 2a), but for the other plans, the rate and cost
mix components seem to follow no particular pattern. Plans 2aand 2b
are in the same firm, and adjusted costsdiffer by $461. (The unadjusted
cost difference is $387.) The difference is primarilydue to the rate mix,
which accounts for a difference of $622. The plan 2a rate mix is concen-
trated in low-cost diagnoses, and the plan 2b rate mix is concentrated
in high-cost diagnoses. This difference attributable to ratemix is par-
tially offset by the cost difference: costs are in fact $159 lower in plan2b
than they are in plan 2a. The small differences that can be attributed to


















Decomposition of adjusted cost difference
cost differences are not shown graphically but can be seen in table 1.5,
which summarizes the results thus far. It shows first therange in unad-
justed expenditures, then the range in demographic mix adjustments,
the range in adjusted expenditures, and finally therange in adjusted
treatment costs.
Perhaps the most noticeable feature of these results is that therange
in demographic adjusted expenditures accounted for by the treatment
cost mix ($807) is almost as wide as the unadjusted range in expendi-
tures ($838). Even though the effects of demographic mixare large,
with the difference between the lowest and highest adjustments equal
to $649, remaining differences in treatment cost are still very large. Dif-
ferences in cost due to the different mixes of illness thatare treated also
accounts for large differences in cost ($626) once demographic mix is
controlled for.
Once the decomposition has been set out in this way,more detailed
comparisons can be made. For example, is there a relationship between
the "severity" of the diagnosis and differences in treatment costacross
plans? Figure 1.6 suggests that there is little relationship. It shows the
range in cost for each of the thirty diagnoses divided by the average
treatment cost for the diagnosis. There is essentially no relationship. Of22 Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
Table 1.5
Range in differences by source
Source Range
Unadjusted expenditures $838
Demographic mix: total $649
Demographic adjusted expenditures: total $772
Rate mix $626
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Figure 1.7
Adjusted cost difference versus mean
course, the range in dollar differences increases with average treatment
cost, but the differences normalized by average cost do not.
Figure 1.7 compares the differences between treatment costs by diag-
nosis in the highest and lowest treatment cost plans (demographically
adjusted). Plan 21 has the highest treatment cost and plan 15 has the
lowest. One important feature of this figure is that, in all but two diag-
noseswhich are ordered by average treatment costthe cost is
higher in the high-cost plan 21 than in the low-cost plan 15. The other
feature is that the cost difference normalized byaverage treatment cost
is unrelated to the average cost of treatment. Thus, the treatment cost is
higher for almost all diagnoses in the high-cost plan, and the relative
difference is unrelated to average treatment intensity.
While treatment costs are consistently higher in the high-cost plan,
Figure 1.8 shows no evident pattern in the treatment rates in thesetwo
plans. Similar deconstruction calculations basedon plans from
multiplan firms suggest that the rate as well as the treatment costmay
vary systematically by plan, with the treatment cost negatively related
to the diagnosis rate. This result is not consistent witha selection effect,
in which unfavorable selection would be expected to result both in-0.010 -0.005 0.005
Figure 1.8
Adjusted rate difference
higher diagnosis rates and higher treatment intensity. The result is con-
sistent with more aggressive treatment of a disease, resulting in higher
diagnosis rates and higher total costs, which may mean more intensive
treatment of "marginal" patients who would not be treated asinten-
sively in other plans.
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the cost and rate differences by diagnosis
for the two plans-2a and 2bthat are in the same firm. Demo-
graphically adjusted costs are $159 higher in plan 2a than in plan 2b.
Figure 1.9 shows that plan 2a cost is greater in all but seven of the thirty
diagnosis groups. But again there is little relationship between the nor-
malized difference and the average treatment cost, although the figure
suggests that the differences may be somewhat lower forhigh-treat-
ment-cost diagnoses. On the other hand, the rate mix inplan 2a is more
concentrated in low-cost diagnoses than it is in plan 2b. Indeed the rate
in the three lowest cost diagnoses is higher in plan 2a but lower inall
but two of the remaining diagnoses. Thus, these data suggest thatthe
differences in plan provisions yield higher treatment costs in plan 2a
but fewer treatments for high cost diagnoses. On balance, thelower
treatment rate outweighs the higher costs.
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Mental health plus substance abuse
IV.Variation Across Many Plans for Two Diagnoses
For some diagnoses, we have begun to calculate rate and treatment
costadjusted for demographic mixfor several plans. In our terms,
expenditure is given by treatment rate times cost given treatment. As
the systematic decomposition suggests, both the rate of treatment and
cost given treatment contribute greatly to expenditure differences
across firms. We consider two illustrations: mental illness and sub-
stance abuse, and pregnancy (childbirth). Treatment for mental illness
and substance abuse combined accounts for about 5.6 percent of health
care expenditures in the eight plans discussed above, not counting out-
patient treatment.
Figure 1.11 shows treatment cost by treatment rate for mental illness
and substance abuse in forty-three plans. (In this and subsequent
figures, the "highlow" bands around the treatment cost estimates rep-
resent 95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates.) Both the rate
of treatment across plans and treatment cost vary by a factor of more
than two. Thus, both contribute to the variation in expenditure across
firms. The same is true for substance abuse and mental illness consid-
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1.12. In this case, the treatment rate varies by a factor of more than three
and treatment cost varies by a factor of about two and a half. The inten-
sity (mode) of treatment is of course an important determinant of cost.
Figures 1.13 and 1.14 show differences in the rate and cost of outpatient
(less intensive) versus inpatient (more intensive) treatments. In both
cases there is large variation in both the rate and cost of treatment.
Pregnancy (including childbirth) provides another illustration. In the
eight plans discussed above, pregnancy accounts for about 4.7 percent
of health care expenditures. Both the rate of pregnancy and the cost of
delivery contribute to the wide variation in expenditure. Figure 1.15
shows treatment cost for pregnancy by the rate of pregnancy. The rate
varies by a factor of about two and the rate for treatment cost varies by
about one and a half. An important determinant of cost is the intensity
of treatment for delivery, in particular vaginal delivery (less intensive)
versus cesarean (more intensive). Figures 1.16 and 1.17 show that the
rate and cost for these alternative levels of treatment intensity vary
substantially across plans. (In this case, the rate is shown as the per-
centage of all deliveries that are vaginal and cesarian.)
Although not shown here, similar figures show wide variation in
AMI rate and treatment cost. And no matter what the mode of
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Figure 1.17
Cesarean deliveries
treatment, both the rate and the treatment cost vary substantially
across plans.
These illustrations make clear that expenditure variation across all
plans is determined both by the rate of treatment and by treatment
cost. Even for given modes of treatment, like cesarian versus vag-
inal delivery, both the rate and the treatment cost vary greatly across
plans.
V.Summary and Discussion
To understand better the sources of cost differences in health care ex-
penditures across firms, we have developed a method to decompose
expenditure differences across firms into their component parts. While
an important goal is to illustrate the method, the substantive results
also seem striking. We have documented large differences in health
care spending across the eight firms included in our analysis. Our de-
composition does not say why the differences exist, but it does indicate
which differences must be explained if differences in health care costs
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both treatment cost and in the rate of treatment for various diagnoses,
even after the demographic mix effects have been removed. The
findings suggest that both differences in treatment intensity as well as
diagnosis mix may be affected by differences in plan provisions. Both
differences could be attributed to plan incentives. Recall that this anal-
ysis is based on one-plan firms. Selection effects within firms are not
confounded with incentive effects, as is typically the case when em-
ployees are offered a menu of plans from which to choose. Although
these results do not adjust for regional differences in health care cost,
they are consistent with cost differences attributed in part to regional
differences in treatment practice and the price of health care. We know,
however, that differences in treatment cost like those shown in figure
1.7 exist between firms in the same geographic locations. Indeed there
is a large difference between the costs in plans 2a and 2b, which are in
the same geographic locations. In this case, the cost difference can be
attributed primarily to differences in diagnosis rate mix.
Some of these descriptive findings on the relationship between de-
mographic characteristics, disease treatment rates, and expenditures
associated with particular diseases can be translated almost directly
into implications for policy and additional research. For example, we
can quantify the average effects of each of these factors on private
health care spending and identify the "high-variation" groups that ac-
count for the bulk of differences in expenditures across employers. By
using these methods with panel data, we can also quantify the main
sources of changes in health care expenditures and the high-variation
components of expenditure growth across firms. When combined with
a breakdown of trends in the major components of health costs, the de-
composition will permit assessment of the determinants of future med-
ical cost increases under the current system. The findings can also be
used to assess the effects of trends in the demographic composition of
firm workforces. Finally, we can assess the effects of changes in insur-
ance coverage, like opening Medicare to persons 55 to 64. We plan to
extend these analytic methods to the much larger number of firms par-
ticipating in our study.
Note
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